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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corp, : 
on behalf of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHARLES KANE, Case No. 20060109-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). Appellant Charles Kane was convicted of driving under the influence, a class A 
misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004); and a red light 
violation, a class C misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-24 (Supp. 2004). 
(R. 114-117).] A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements obtained in violation 
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its progeny. 
Standard of Review: A bifurcated standard applies. This Court will review factual 
findings for clear error, State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995), and legal 
conclusions for correctness. See State v. Rettenbergen 1999 UT 80, ^10, 984 P.2d 1009. 
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 The statutes relating to traffic rules and regulations were revised and renumbered in 
February 2005. Since the events giving rise to this case occurred in October 2004, 
Appellant Kane has relied on the statutes in effect at that time. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved in the record at 36-40; 136; 137; 138:3-4. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend V; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (Supp. 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On December 2, 2004, prosecutors for Salt Lake City filed charges against Kane 
for three counts of driving under the influence and a red light violation. (R. 3-5). In 
March 2005, the defense filed a motion to dismiss two counts of driving under the 
influence, and a motion to suppress statements made in violation of Kane's rights per 
Miranda. (R. 31-40). The city opposed the motions. (R. 43-56). On April 28, 2005, the 
trial court entered its ruling. Judge Dever denied the motion to suppress and granted the 
motion to dismiss. (R. 58). A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum C. 
Thereafter, the case was transferred to Judge Reese for trial. On September 6, 
2005, during a pretrial conference, the defense renewed the motion to suppress. (R. 137). 
The court denied it. (R. 77; 137:3-4). A copy of the order is attached as Addendum D. 
On November 2, 2005, the court presided over a jury trial in the matter. (R. 138). 
At the conclusion, the jury found Kane guilty as charged. (R. 102-03). On January 24, 
2006, the court sentenced Kane to a suspended jail term and probation. (R. 114-17). 
On February 1, 2006, Kane filed a notice of appeal. (R. 121). The appeal is 
timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2006). Kane is not incarcerated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ihe city presented e\ luuiee at inaj reiJecung UK haiow mg: ' M vioi^a i ." • )4, 
<-: :«-\;'^aic". i .uO in the moi mil . n^ c;i-i nn MU '<.-nth - : . - .m ".• 
Temple w uii a green light when a southbound truck Mn ck u !\ 13S: U-15J. flu-
impact oi [he , wiiision sent the car to the soi ithwest corner ol n,c intersection near a gas 
; . \w . i - ^ . . i • . H • ' p h - - . - f ^ [< r v : , , 
a third vehicle called emergency crews and requested an ambulance. (R. 138:10). Also, 
police were dispatched to the area. (R. 138:17-18). 
Officer Fa lknei testified that J * 1 len lie ai i i\ ed, ,-• >-. lie A \, . •:,
 lt < - I i : • was c l it 
side the truck. (R. 138:18-19). Kane stated he was the driver of the truck. (Id.) Falkner 
could smell alcohol oi. him from five fvci away. (Id.) Tie noticed that Kane had hlood-
much he had to drink. Kane said he "had a six-pack." (R. 138:20, 22, 24). 
Falkner conducted field sobriety tests. CR. 1 3S:~ 1\ He started with the horizontal 
gaze nystagmus tea ; acrcmaiua ;\, ..•= . ,. ^ n;.a legiotcis ,.:\ oiuntar* K ^ V ;i ^Hon-
or nystagmus - in liiu eves. ; ' • ' Falkner noieu ' bix uues" for intoxication from 
that test. (R. 138:26). falkner then administered the "walk and mm test," which registers 
balance and coorduiaia •-• ,^.\:.:,v.:v j . i ic nouu m ,; Nan • m;uic i:.:"oe missteps 
during th< it test (S ee R 138:30 31). 
Falkner next administered the "one legged stand," w hi^;- in\ oh ed taking one foot 
off the ground and couiiiuui • • ;O:. '4K falkner testified u-.u Kane had piobleins 
counting and used his ai i i is tc stay balanced. (R 138:3 \ 35) 
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Finally, Falkner administered a portable breath test. It registered positive for 
alcohol. (R. 138:54, 126). 
Falkner determined that based on the field sobriety tests, Kane was under the 
influence of alcohol. (R. 138:36). Falkner arrested Kane (id.), and gave him standard 
"admonitions." (R. 138:37). He told Kane that he was under arrest, and he requested that 
Kane submit to a chemical test at the police station where he would blow into a 
breathalyzer to measure blood alcohol content. (See R. 138:37-38). 
Falkner also advised Kane of the following: 
Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or 
a metabolite in your breath in violation of Utah law or the presence of alcohol 
and/or drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle 
may result in a denial, suspension or disqualification of your driving privilege or 
refusal to issue you a license. What is your response to my request that you 
submit to a chemical test. 
(R. 138:38). 
According to Falkner, Kane had no objection, so they went to the police station for 
the test. (R. 138:38-39). 
As Kane "started to blow" in the breathalyzer, Falkner told him to blow harder. 
(R. 138:39). At that point Kane advised Falkner that he wanted an attorney. (R. 138:39). 
Falkner told him he was not entitled to one. (See R. 138:40). The conversation went 
back and forth along those lines for 20 minutes. (R. 138:54). Falkner considered Kane's 
response to be a refusal on the breathalyzer, and he gave Kane his warnings per Miranda. 
(R. 138:40-42,54,55). 
According to Falkner, Kane agreed to talk. (R. 138:42, 55). Kane told Falkner 
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that he had been to a club that night listening to a rap group, and he drank six or four 
beers, "two bottles and two cans," from 8:00 p.m. to 11:30. (R. 138:42-43). 
Falkner booked Kane into jail. (R. 138:44). According to Falkner, Kane was 
"very coherent, answering questions fine, didn't seem to have a problem, you know, 
understanding anything or comprehending anything. Didn't seem - he didn't complain 
about having a headache or feeling woozy or anything like that." (R. 138:44-45). 
At the conclusion of the prosecutor's case, Kane presented evidence from a 
medical expert concerning the HGN test. (R. 138:86-105). In short, Dr. Rothfeder 
testified that if he were to observe a nystagmus or an involuntary jerky motion in the eyes 
during an HGN test, he could not conclude that the person had consumed a certain 
amount of alcohol. (See R. 138:92, 105). According to Rothfeder, a number of 
possibilities may explain nystagmus, including a cranial nerve dysfunction, a closed head 
injury, a variety of inner ear infections or other diseases, taking aspirin, consuming coffee 
and/or using nicotine. (R. 138:92-93). 
Next, Kane testified. He stated that on October 16, he went to a friend's house at 
4:00 in the afternoon. (R. 138:116). Shortly thereafter, he had a "couple beers." (Id.) 
At approximately 10:00 he went with friends to a club downtown. (R. 138:117). 
Between 10:00 and 1:00 he had two beers. (R. 138:118, 143). He left the club in his 
truck with friends. As they drove home along West Temple, he was temporarily 
distracted by an animal crossing the road. (R. 138:118-19, 135-36). He approached the 
intersection at 600 South and checked his rearview mirror, when he made contact with 
the other vehicle. (R. 138:119). During impact, he hit his head inside the truck and was 
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disoriented. (R. 138:120-21, 123, 148). 
Kane also discussed the field sobriety tests and events at the station. (R. 138:124-
26). He testified that he requested an attorney because he did not trust the officer. (R. 
138:127). Finally, Kane denied that he was intoxicated or impaired. (R. 138:128, 150). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Kane guilty as charged. (R. 
138:162). This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Miranda and its progeny, when a suspect requests counsel prior to or 
during police interrogation, officers may not engage in further questioning until the 
suspect has had an opportunity to consult with counsel. In this case, Falkner arrested 
Kane and transported him to the police station in order to further investigate whether 
Kane was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision on West 
Temple and 600 South. Kane agreed to cooperate with the investigation and he agreed to 
breathalyzer testing. Kane also repeatedly requested counsel. Falkner advised Kane that 
he was not entitled to counsel. After discussing the matter for 20 minutes with Kane, 
Falkner noted Kane's request as a refusal to cooperate, he administered Miranda 
warnings, and he obtained a confession from Kane that he had consumed four or six beers 
prior to the collision. The confession was obtained in violation of Kane's rights per 
Miranda, [t should have been suppressed. Evidence of the confession prejudiced Kane. 
This Court should reverse the trial court rulings and remand the case for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER OBTAINED KANETS CONFESSION IN VIOLATION OF 
MIRANDA. 
A. WHEN A SUSPECT REQUESTS COUNSEL, OFFICERS MAY NOT 
ENGAGE IN A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION. 
The federal constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any cri-
minal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, amend. V; see also Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege against self 
incrimination is available "outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way 
from being compelled to incriminate themselves." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
467 (1966). Also, to ensure the right of the individual against government-induced self 
incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a suspect's right to 
counsel under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 469-70. 
"[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends 
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel 
present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." Id at 470. The Supreme 
Court has specified that "[a]n individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a 
lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask 
for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver." Id. 
Stated another way, while a pre-interrogation request affirmatively secures an 
individual's right to have counsel present, id., failure to make a pre-interrogation request 
does not constitute a wavier. For the defendant who has not specifically made a pre-
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interrogation request for counsel, officers must advise that the defendant "has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will 
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; 
id, at 444. 
Also, if a defendant has indicated "in any manner and at any stage of the process 
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 
Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added). This is true whether the defendant invokes the right to 
counsel during questioning, see id. at 473-74; or whether he makes a pre-interrogation 
request for a lawyer. See id. at 470. 
Once a defendant has requested an attorney, the officers may not engage in 
questioning. See id. at 474. "At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to 
confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If 
the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before 
speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the defendant was interrogated twice 
in connection with a robbery, burglary and murder. Id, at 479. During the first interroga-
tion, officers told Edwards they had a taped statement from another suspect implicating 
him in the crimes. Edwards denied involvement, gave a statement for an alibi defense, 
then expressed that he wanted to "make a deal." Id The officers told him they had no 
authority to negotiate, and gave him a telephone number for a county attorney. Edwards 
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made the call, hung up after a moment, and stated "I want an attorney before making a 
deal M Id. Officeis ceased questioning and leturned Edwards to his cell. Id. 
The next morning, two detectives arrived at the jail and informed the guard they 
wanted to see Edwaids When the guard delivered the message, Edwards replied that he 
did not want to talk to anyone. IdL The guard told Edwards "lie had1 to talk ' to the 
detectives, and he took Edwards to them. Id. 
The detectives informed Edwards of his Miranda rights, and he said he would talk. 
However, Edwards first wanted to hear the taped statement of the other suspect, and he 
requested that the detectives not tape the interview with him. After the detectives agreed 
to the conditions, Edwards implicated himself in the crimes. Id at 479. Sometime 
thereafter, Edwards was convicted. He appealed, and the Arizona court upheld the trial 
court ruling that Edwards waived his rights per Miranda during the second interrogation. 
Id at 479-80. 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. It reversed. Id. at 480. The 
Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by 
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation 
even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as 
Edwaids, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conveisations with the police. 
Id at 484-85 In Edwaids, defendant invoked the right to counsel Thus, officers could 
not subject him to further interrogation until counsel was made available. See id at 479, 
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484-85; see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (recognizing that if a 
suspect believes he is not capable of proceeding without counsel, any subsequent waiver 
at the authorities' behest is the product of "inherently compelling pressures" and not the a 
result of the voluntary choice of the suspect); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58, 476 (descri-
bing the inherently compelling pressures of the modem in-custody interrogation, where 
officers use subtle techniques that include removing suspects from familiar surroundings, 
family and friends, and isolating them at the station for interrogation purposes). 
Next, in U.S. v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991), defendant came home to 
find several police officers conducting a search for contraband. Id. at 1198. Defendant 
was searched, arrested, handcuffed, and placed on a couch with other arrestees. Id. 
Defendant "asked to see his lawyer thiee or four times." Id. The police responded that 
"if they fallow[ed] him to see [his] lawyer now, then they would not be able to ask [him] 
any further questions and would have to take [him] to jail.'" Id. Defendant was not 
questioned at that point, and he was not given Miranda warnings "until much later." I d 
When he was thereafter questioned at the house, he agreed to talk, and he made 
incriminating statements. See id. After conviction he appealed. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the defendant's 
request for a lawyer sufficiently invoked the protections of Edwards, even though the re-
quest was made before questioning or before officers administered Miranda warnings: 
The undisputed facts in the case before us fulfill the two criteria for applying the 
Edwards bright-line rule: Kelsey invoked his right to deal with the police through 
an attorney, and the police initiated questioning after Kelsey had requested a 
lawyer and before he had been provided one. 
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Id. at 1198. Where officers disregarded the request for counsel and later proceeded with 
the Miranda warnings, a waiver, and confession, that was unlawful. Id. at 1199; see also 
State v. Torres, 412 S.E.2d 20, 24-25 (N.C. 1992) (stating that defendant's request for an 
attorney - before warnings were administered - was sufficient under Miranda: defendant 
was transported to the sheriffs department and detained without arrest for three hours 
before questioning; she asked if she needed an attorney and was told she did not before 
officers gave Miranda warnings and she agreed to talk; the interrogation was unlawful). 
Finally, a suspect's request for counsel raises the presumption that he is unable to 
proceed without a lawyer's advice. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681. The presumption 
does not disappear simply because police have provided Miranda warnings. The 
warnings will not serve to "'reassure' a suspect who has been denied the counsel he has 
clearly requested." Id. at 686; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156(1990) 
(stating that where petitioner made a specific request for counsel before the interview, the 
police-initiated interrogation was impermissible); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
300 (1980) ("It is clear . . . that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda 
are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect 
in custody is subjected to inteiTOgation"). 
In sum, under Miranda and its progeny, when a suspect makes a request for coun-
sel, all questioning must cease. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. In this case, Kane made a 
request for counsel. (See infra, Argument B., herein). Thereafter, Falkner engaged in a 
custodial inteiTOgation. The inteiTOgation violated Miranda law. Thus, as further set forth 
below, statements made by Kane during the interrogation should have been suppressed. 
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B. KANE REQUESTED COUNSEL BEFORE THE INTERROGATION. 
THUS, THE OFFICER WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH 
QUESTIONING. 
During pre-trial proceedings before Judge Dever, the defense filed a motion and 
memorandum to suppress statements made in violation of Miranda. (R. 36-40). Accor-
ding to the stipulated facts, Falkner arrested Kane and transported him to the station. (R. 
36-37, 44). Falkner then requested that Kane submit to a breath test and Kane agreed to 
do so. (R. 37, 44). Kane also requested counsel. (R. 37, 44). 
Falkner explained "to him over and over that he did not have a right to coun[sel] 
for the test and told him that he would be refusing the test if he did not do as instructed." 
(R. 37, 44). Kane "refused the test." (R. 37, 44). Fallaier then "advised Mr. Kane of his 
Miranda rights." (R. 37, 44). Kane indicated he understood his rights and would talk. 
Falkner asked questions and Kane "indicated that he had been drinking at a club and that 
he had consumed '6 beers, 4 beers (2 bottles 2 cans)." (R. 37, 44). "He also indicated 
that his first drink was at 8:00 and his last drink was at 11:30." (R. 37). 
On the basis of those facts, Judge Dever denied the motion to suppress. He ruled 
that the request for counsel related to the breath test. Also, "[w]hen Miranda was given 
to the defendant he was willing to and did provide information." (R. 58). In connection 
with the ruling, the judge did not consider witness testimony, he was not required to 
make credibility determinations, and he did not make specific findings. (See R. 58; see 
also R. 77 (same)). 
Thereafter, during pre-trial proceedings before Judge Reese, counsel renewed the 
motion to suppress. (R. 137:3). Without considering evidence, or the events as they 
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transpired in the earlier proceedings, the court denied the motion and stated that the prior 
ruling "would be the law of the case." (R. 137:3-4; 77); but see Red Flame, Inc. v. 
Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ffi[4 & 5, 996 P.2d 540 (stating there are exceptions to the "law of 
the case" rule; one exception is when the issues decided by the first judge are presented in 
a different light with additional evidence, and another potential exception is when the 
first ruling was erroneous and will infect the proceedings). 
On the first day of trial, counsel again advised the court that "we did have a mo-
tion to suppress," which had previously been denied. (R. 138:3-4). Judge Reese indicated 
that he had entered an order to that effect, and the case proceeded to trial. (R. 138:4). 
During trial, Falkner described events at the accident scene (see supra, Statement 
of Facts, pages 3-5, herein), and he testified that he arrested Kane and requested that 
Kane submit to a breath test. (See R. 138:37-38). Falkner advised Kane that the test 
results may result "in a denial, suspension or disqualification of your driving privilege or 
refusal to issue you a license." (R. 138:38). According to Falkner, Kane agreed to take 
the test. (R. 138:38, 126). Thereafter, Falkner transported Kane to the police station, and 
as Kane "started to blow," Falkner told him to try harder. (R. 138:39). 
At that point Kane advised Falkner that he wanted a lawyer. (Id.) Falkner 
testified that the conversation about a lawyer went on for 20 minutes or more (R. 138:54), 
where Kane said, "Do I need a lawyer," "Well, I think I want my lawyer here before I 
take this test" (R. 138:39), "Well, I want an attorney - I want to call an attorney to see if I 
should take this test or not." (R. 138:54). Also, "Do you think I should do that?" 
"Should I have an attorney?" (R. 138:54). "Okay, I do want an attorney." (R. 138:55). 
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As Kane continued to request an attorney, Falkner maintained he did not have the 
right to an attorney. (See R. 138:54-55). Also, Falkner told Kane that his "right to 
remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply" to the breathalyzer, since it is "civil 
in nature and separate from your criminal charges." (R. 138:40). 
Kane maintained that he wanted to consult with a lawyer due to a "lack of trust 
towards the officer. They would try and coerce and lead you into the way that they want 
you[J to lead you to get information or to basically make an arrest." (R. 138:127). 
As Kane continued to request a lawyer, Falkner warned Kane "[m]any, many, 
many times" that he did not have the right to a lawyer, and that his actions would 
constitute a refusal to take the test. (R. 138:41). Kane maintained that he was not 
refusing the test, and he wanted a lawyer. (R. 138:41). 
Falkner then administered Miranda warnings. (R. 138:42). According to Falkner, 
Kane undeistood the warnings and agreed to talk. (R. 138:42). During questioning, 
Kane told Falkner that he "had six beers" then he said, "Well, I think it was four beers. I 
had two bottles and two cans" between 8:00 p.m. and 11:30. (R. 138:43). Also, when 
Falkner asl<ed if Kane "was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage right now," 
Kane did not respond. (R. 138:44). 
The facts and the law reflect a Miranda violation. Falkner proceeded with 
questioning after Kane requested counsel. That was unlawful. 
In Edwards, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that when a suspect 
has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject 
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
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unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations 
with the police." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added). To implement this 
rule, the Court held that any statements a suspect makes after requesting an attorney and 
before being provided with one are not admissible unless it is clear that the suspect, and 
not the police, initiated the dialogue with authorities. Id at 485-87. 
The facts here fulfill the criteria for applying the Edwards bright-line rule: Kane 
was in custody and under arrest at the police station (R. 138:36, 38-39), he repeatedly 
"invoked his right to deal with the police through an attorney, and the police initiated 
questioning after [defendant] had requested a lawyer and before he had been provided 
one." Kelsey,951 F.2d at 1198; (R. 138:54-55). 
The fact that Kane invoked his right to counsel before Falkner administered 
Miranda warnings is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has specified that the Edwards rule 
is triggered when the suspect makes a statement "that can reasonably be construed to be 
an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police" McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (emphasis 
in original). 
In this case, Falkner acknowledged that Kane intended to proceed with the 
breathalyzer test; he wanted to cooperate. (See R. 138:38, 41). Also, Kane wanted a 
lawyer. Those are two separate matters. 
The request for a lawyer related to Kane's concerns about dealing with Falkner and 
the criminal investigation that he was conducting, including the imminent interrogation. 
(See R. 37; 44; 138:127; see also 138:38, 41 (Falkner acknowledged that Kane wanted to 
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cooperate with the breathalyzer test, and he also requested counsel at the station)). 
Indeed, Kane's concerns were valid. The record here shows that as Kane 
repeatedly requested an attorney, Falkner rejected that request and represented to Kane 
that the breathalyzer results related to civil proceedings. (R. 138:40). Thus, according to 
Falkner, Kane would not be entitled to counsel. (R. 138:40-41, 54-55). Yet, the law 
allows the government to use the breathalyzer results in criminal proceedings. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5(1) (Supp. 2004). 
That is, while a defendant would not be entitled to counsel in breathalyzer testing 
for purposes of the civil proceedings ((see R. 38; 136:4-5 (acknowledging that Kane 
would not be entitled to counsel for matters relating to civil investigation)); American 
Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985) (stating that a defendant's rights 
against self incrimination were not violated when, after his arrest, he was required to 
submit to a breathalyzer test under the threat of losing his driver's license); see also 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588 (1990); Schmerberv. Calif., 384 U.S. 757, 
761-63 (1966)), the officer here was engaged in a criminal investigation as well, which 
included interrogation. Kane would be entitled to counsel for that purpose. See Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444-45, 470; Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1198-99. 
Yet, the officer here sent the message to Kane that it would be useless to request 
counsel in connection with the post-arrest investigation conducted at the police station. 
(R. 37, 44 (Falkner advised Kane he was not entitled to counsel)). That was improper. 
The fact that a suspect is not entitled to counsel for purposes of civil proceedings where 
the breathalyzer results may be admitted is an issue separate from the criminal 
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proceedings. In this case, when Kane invoked the right to counsel, it was in connection 
with events transpiring for purposes of the criminal investigation. (See R. 37; 44 
(reflecting that Kane initially intended to cooperate with breathalyzer testing; and he 
requested counsel); 138:41 (same); 138:126-27 (reflecting that Kane requested counsel 
because he did not trust the officer)). 
When a suspect requests counsel, a presumption arises "that he considers himself 
unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance." 
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683. Thus, in order to protect a suspect's right against self-
incrimination in an inherently coercive situation, the Edwards Court requires that ques-
tioning stop. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Also, Miranda warnings will not cure the 
request for counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686. 
This case illustrates the coercive atmosphere discussed in Miranda where Falkner 
arrested Kane, took him to the station, refused to honor his requests for counsel, and in 
fact, represented to Kane that the test related only to civil proceedings and Kane would 
not be entitled to counsel. When Falkner then provided Miranda warnings, he had already 
advised Kane he would not be entitled to counsel, and Kane's request for counsel had 
already been repeatedly rejected. 
Under the circumstances, once Kane made a request for an attorney, Falkner could 
not then request that Kane waive that right. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. "If the police 
do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been 
no break in custody), the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore 
inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver 
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and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards." McNeil, 
50} U.S. at J 77. 
The trial courts in this case erred. The undisputed facts and the additional 
evidence adduced at trial support that Kane's request for counsel brought this case within 
the ambit of Edwards, requiring suppression of the confession. The trial court rulings 
should be reversed. 
C. THE EVIDENTIARY ERROR PREJUDICED KANE. 
Where a trial court has erred in admitting a confession into evidence, the 
conviction must be reversed unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 3 20 (1991). The constitutional analysis for 
prejudice requires reversal unless the city can show that the confession did not contribute 
to the defendant's conviction. Id. at 296; State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (stating that this Court will focus on "whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction") 
(cite omitted). The remaining evidence presented at trial must be so weighty that it 
assures the conviction. 
"This higher standard does not require reversal solely because we might imagine a 
single juror whose decision hinged on [defendant's] confession. Rather, 'we look to what 
seems to us to have been the probable impact of the confession on the minds of the 
average juror.1" State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (quoting Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)). 
In this case, weighty evidence did not exist to support the conviction for driving 
18 
under the influence. Also, the jury was required to resolve conflicts and disputes in the 
evidence. Thus, it is likely that the confession played a pivotal role in causing the jury to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence against Kane. See e.g. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 
(recognizing that a confession is like no other evidence; "confessions have profound 
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt [the jury's] ability to put 
them out of mind even if told to do so") (cites omitted). 
Specifically, while the city's remaining evidence supports that Kane was driving 
the truck when he ran a red light and made contact with a car in the intersection, that 
evidence supports the conviction for the lesser red-light violation. (See R. 138:13-16 
(testifying that the truck ran the red light and made contact with the car); 138:19 (reflec-
ting that Kane identified himself as the driver of the truck)); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-24. 
However, before the jury could convict Kane of a class A misdemeanor offense 
for driving under the influence, it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, or that he was under 
the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle, and he operated the vehicle in a manner that inflicted bodily injury upon another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i), (ii), (3)(a)(ii)(A). 
Evidence of a collision would not be sufficient to support each element of the 
offense. See id. (requiring proof of blood-alcohol concentration or impairment). Also, 
where the city had no evidence of alcohol concentration in this case, it was required to 
prove that Kane was under the influence of alcohol to a degree to render him incapable of 
safely driving. The evidence relating to that fact was in conflict and dispute. 
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According to Falkner, he could smell alcohol when he approached Kane. (R. 
138:19). That does not support that Kane was sufficiently under the influence to be 
impaired or to render him incapable of safely driving. See State v. Bcrtoch, 2005 UT 
App 68, 2005 WL 375092 (stating that the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath and the 
condition of defendant's vehicle were not sufficient to support probable cause) 
(unpublished opinion), attached hereto as Addendum E; Utah R. App. P. 30(f) (2006) 
(citing unpublished opinions). There may be other explanations for such a smell that 
Falkner apparently did not explore here. (R. 138:49 (stating that when he observed clues 
for intoxication, he made no inquiry into the matter)). 
Falkner also testified to the field sobriety tests he conducted. With respect to the 
HGN, Falkner observed nystagmus and noted six clues for intoxication. (R. 138:24-26). 
Yet, a defense witness, Dr. Rothfeder, testified there are several explanations for 
nystagmus that are unrelated to alcohol consumption. (R. 138:93-95, 105). Indeed, 20 
percent of patients simply have the condition. (R. 138:99). At the time of the field tests 
here, Falkner did not inquire into any other possible explanation for what he considered 
to be clues for intoxication. (R. 138:49). 
Falkner also conducted the "walk and turn test," which assesses balance and 
coordination. (R. 138:28-29). According to Falkner, during that test, Kane failed to 
make contact on one step with heel to toe, he stepped off an imaginary line, and he did 
not take small steps to turn. (See R. 138:30). Those observations could be explained 
without concluding intoxication. Specifically, Kane was having problems with his ankle 
that evening due to an injury from an accident in 1997. (See R. 13 8:23, 33). He revealed 
20 
that to the officer. (Id.) That may account for the missteps. Also, Kane testified that he 
hurt his head during the impact, which may account for missteps. (See R. 138:23, 120-
21, 123, 148). Where jurors were required to resolve those disputed factual issues, there 
is a reasonable probability that - but for the inadmissible confession - they would have 
resolved them in favor of Kane. 
Falkner's third field test involved the one-legged stand. (R. 138:34). According to 
Falkner, Kane was able to do that. (R. 138:34, 50). Falkner then testified that Kane 
made mistakes: he was wobbly, he used his arms to balance, and he was not able to count 
as directed. (R. 138:34-35). According to Falkner, those events did not constitute 
official clues for intoxication, but he considered them to be indicators. (R. 138:35). 
Falkner's testimony left the impression that he would be willing to re-write the rules on 
the sobriety tests in order to suit his puiposes to find intoxication. A perceptive jury may 
consider that to be offensive. 
Falkner also testified that Kane's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and his speech 
was slow and slurred. (R. 138:20). Those symptoms may have other explanations, parti-
cularly where it was late in the evening and Kane had just been involved in a collision. 
Falkner claimed that at the scene of the impact, Kane disclosed he had a six-pack 
to drink (R. 138:20, 22, 24); however, Faulkner did not know whether that was over the 
course of the day or longer. (R. 138:24). Without more information, that disclosure was 
meaningless and would not support intoxication or impairment. 
Finally, Falkner testified that during the encounter, Kane "seemed very coherent, 
answering questions fine, didn't seem to have a problem, you know, understanding or 
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compiehendmg anything " (R 138 44-45) That evidence would support that Kane was 
not intoxicated 01 impaiied Also, Kane confirmed that he was not intoxicated 01 
impaiied at the time of the collision (R 138 128, 150) 
Kane testified that he had two beeis between 4 30 and 6 30 and two beeis between 
10 15 and midnight (R 138116-18) He was not impaiied when he left the club (R 
138 128, 1 SO), he was dnvmg along West Temple when he became distiacted by an 
animal in the load (R 138 119), he hit a cai when he went thiough the inteisection, he hit 
his head on impact, but did not disclose that to anyone (R 138 119 21, 128, 134), he was 
disonented (R 138 123), and he was having problems with his ankle (R 138 124) 
Since the evidence lequned jurois to lesolve disputes and conflicts, this Couit 
should not oveilook the effect the inadmissible confession would have on their 
dehbeiations in this case The inadmissible confession would have tipped the balance 
against Kane on the chaige foi dnvmg undei the influence This Court should find that 
Kane was piejudiced by the evidence of the unlawful confession 
CONCLUSION 
Foi the leasons set foith herein, Kane lespectfully lequests lhat this Court leveise 
the tnal court's mling on the motion to suppiess and lemand the case foi a new tnal 
SUBMITTED this 1 lp day of " f\r A \ , 2006 
Linda M Jones V 
Michael Misner 
Sam Newton 
Salt Lake Legal Defendei Assoc 
Attorneys foi Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CHARLES S KANE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 045900276 MD 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: January 24, 2 0 06 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : mar lened 
P r o s e c u t o r : ZIMMERMAN, KRISTIN L 
D e f e n d a n t 
Defendant's Attorney(s): NEWTON, SAMUEL P 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 23, 1969 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 10:09 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2005 Guilty 
4. RED LIGHT VIOLATION - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 365 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 360 day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously served. 
Page 1 
Case Nc: 045900276 
Date: Jan 24, 2006 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Charge # 2 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge : 
Total Principal Due: 
The fine is to be paid 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
$1500.00 
$0.00 
$704 .89 
$1500.00 
$1500.00 
$0 
$7 04 . 89 
$1500.00 
Plus Interest 
in Eull by 11/24/2006 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month (s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service. 
Defendant to serve 5 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by February 10, 2006. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500.00 which incLudes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before November 24, 2006. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATEON CONDITIONS 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Violate no laws. 
PAY $1,500.00 FINE 
SERVE 5 DAYS JAIL - CREDIT FOR 2 DAYS JAIL - REPORT 2/10/06 
PAY FULL RESTITUTION - CITY TO SUBMIT AMOUNT BY 3/15/06 
SUBMIT TO RANDOM TESTING 
COMPLETE EVALUATION 
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Case No: 045900276 
Date: Jan 24, 2006 
ATTEND IMPACT PANEL 
Dated this day of , 20 
ROBIN W. REESE 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
CITY/STATE Plaintiff 
-VS-
Kft^ W,-
Case Number 0 ^-f Q ^ / Q j Q _ , ^ ' 
Tape Number _/ C# -\ju'->Q. 
U. 
Date \ 3 V / f l k _ Time 
Defendant 
DOBQ|„ Q 3 ^ °) 
Interpreter
 C4___. 
CHARGES T D - O ^ y i ] ^ 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
Judge/Comm 
Clerk 
Qa^ & 
mci 
Plaintiff Counsel _ 
Defense Counsel </N 
Amended 
Amended 
4-
.ULVVL/WVO A X I V J L ^ 
j Q t i . i3tf^-^-
0) jan 3 ^ ^ ^ 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence . 
(2) Fine Amt. $ Susp. $ 
_ Suspended _7 . T / ^ ^ L J J I ^ A | / ( 
Fee $ Fine Bal $ 
iS^ci 
Payment Schedule: Pay $ 
(3) Court Costs $ 
(4) Community SeivjfigAVP. 
(5) Restitution V T J U J U L 
Attorney Fees $ j \ . 
(6) Probation^ Q ^ ^ y j X ^ 
(7) Terms of probalion: 
\/No Further Violations 
per month/1 st Pmt. Due 
through 
TAL FINE(S) DUE $ \&OQ< 
Last Pmt. Due j i j c ^ l / h 
Pay to: D Court • Victim D Show Proof to Court 
U • Good Behavior • AP&P 71 ACEC D Other 
/ wk ' D AA Meetings; 
Follow Program 
No Alcohol L ^ l O ^ ' U ^ 
D Antibuse 
• Employment 
• Proof of 
/ month 
Counseling thru 
Classes 
'i f in/Out Treatment ^ Health Testing _ 
(8) Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
(9) Review / / at _ 
|_J Crime Lab Procedure , A__ / 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7500, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. District Court Judge 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
INTEREST WILL BE ADDED IF FINE AND/OR RESTITUTION NOT PAID IN FULL TODAY w-i 
ADDENDUM B 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
§ 41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under the influence-
Weight of evidence 
(l)(a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical 
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does not render the 
results of a chemical test inadmissible Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol 
content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution. 
(2) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at the time relevant to the alleged offense. 
Laws 1979, c. 243, § 3; Laws 1983, c. 99, § 15; Laws 1987, c. 138, § 39; Laws 1993, c. 
161, § 1; Laws 2002, c. 106, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. 
ADDENDUM C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES S KANE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING/MOTION 
HEARING 
Case No: 045900276 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Date: 04/28/2005 
Clerk: rhondam 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. Court finds arguments 
from the City are persuasive and defendant's 1st request applied to 
counsel for the breath test. When Miranda was given to the 
defendant he was willing to and did provide information. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss counts 2 and 3 is granted. Count 1 
is enhanced to a class A misdemeanor, the law allows for an 
enhancement to a class A misdemeanor if someone is injured as a 
result of negligence while committing a DUI. In such a case, no 
matter how many people are injured, there is still only one 
underlying crime which can be enhanced to a class A misdemeanor, 
and not multiple new offenses. 
PRCIP 1 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
By 
FILED DISTRICT C9URT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP - 9 2005 
SALT*yftw OUHNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Charles Kane, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 045900276 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Based on the ruling on Defendant's motions previously entered in this matter by 
Judge L.A. Dever, which was based on evidence presented at a motion hearing on April 
21, 2005 and the memordanda submitted by the parties, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss counts II and III of the information is granted. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
Dated this 7 of September, 2005 
/(yt/ 
ADDENDUM E 
Westlaw 
Not Reported in P 3d 
Not Repoited m P 3d, 2005 WL 375092 (Utah App ), 2005 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 375092 (Utah App.)) 
H 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Travis BERTOCH, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No.20030111-CA. 
Feb. 17,2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; 
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs. 
Lori Seppi, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christine Soltis, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and 
THORNE. 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM 
DECISION TFN11 (Not For Official 
Publication) 
FN1. This Amended 
Memorandum Decision replaces 
the Memorandum Decision in 
Case No. 20030111-CA issued on 
December 16, 2004. Footnote 1 of 
the original opinion has been 
deleted. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Page 1 
UT App 68 
*1 Travis Bertoch appeals the trial 
court's order denying his motion to 
suppress as evidence a pipe and a plastic 
bag of marijuana obtained by police 
during a traffic stop, as well as certain 
statements he made at the scene. He 
claims police discovered this evidence 
after an illegal frisk and that his 
statements were made prior to receiving 
a Miranda warning. The trial court ruled 
that the pipe and marijuana were 
admissible as part of a search incident to 
arrest and that his statements were made 
during a noncustodial police interview. 
Upon this determination, Bertoch entered 
a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony We reverse the trial court's denial 
of Bertoch's motion to suppress. 
"When a case involves the 
reasonableness of a search and seizure, 
'we afford little discretion to the district 
court because there must be state-wide 
standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials.' " State v. 
Warren. 2003 UT 3 6 , 1 12, 78 P.3d 590 
(quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1] 
26, 63 P.3d 650). " 'In reviewing the trial 
court's denial of [a defendant's] motion 
to suppress, we examine the underlying 
factual findings for clear error, and 
review the trial court's conclusions of 
law based thereon for correctness.' " 
State v. Allrecl 2002 UT App 291, 11 8, 
55 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). 
First, Bertoch argues that the pipe and 
© 2006 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig U S Govt. Woiks. 
Not Repoited in P 3d Page 2 
Not Repoited in P 3d, 2005 WL 375092 (Utah App ), 2005 UT App 68 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 375092 (Utah App.)) 
marijuana discovered during the highway 
patrol trooper's initial frisk should be 
suppressed because, as Bertoch contends, 
the trooper lacked a reasonable belief 
that Bertoch was armed and dangerous. 
We agree that the frisk was improper. A 
police officer "may perform a protective 
frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when the 
officer reasonably believes a person is 
'armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or [to] others.' " Warren, 2003 UT 
36 at 11 13 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. K 24 (1968)). "In determining 
reasonableness, 'due weight must be 
given, not to [an officers'] inchoate and 
unparticulaiized suspicion or "hunch," 
but to specific reasonable inferences 
which [an officer] is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience.' 
" hi at 11 14 (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 
27) (alterations in original). Here, the 
trooper's suspicion that the missing trunk 
lid and misplaced license plate indicated 
the car may have been stolen does not 
provide sufficient grounds to perforin a 
frisk. 
The trial court denied the motion to 
suppress, holding that the evidence was 
obtained as part of a search incident to 
arrest. Although a police officer may 
perform a search incident to arrest even 
before a suspect is formally arrested, the 
officer must have "probable cause to 
believe that the suspect has committed or 
is committing an offense.1 " State v. 
Tram. 2002 UT 9 7 ^ 26, 57 P.3d 1052 
(quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 
U.S. 31, 36 (1979)). At the time of the 
frisk in this case, the smell of alcohol on 
Bertoch's breath and the condition of his 
automobile could not provide the trooper 
with probable cause to arrest him. 
*2 Although the State indicates that the 
doctrine of "inevitable discovery" may 
apply to admit the pipe and marijuana, 
we may only affirm on such alternative 
grounds if they are "apparent on the 
record" and sustained by the trial court's 
factual findings. State v. Topanotes, 2003 
UT 30,11 9, 76P.3d 1159. Here, the trial 
court made its ruling from the bench and 
included only cursory factual findings. 
Given this limited information, we can 
neither affirm on alternative grounds nor 
conclude with certainty that the items 
would have been discovered 
independently of the illegal frisk. 
Second, the trial court denied Bertoch's 
motion to suppress his pre-Miranda 
statements. Specifically, Bertoch seeks to 
suppress his admission, which was made 
during the frisk, that he had marijuana in 
his pocket and had smoked marijuana the 
night before. It is clear that such an 
admission may be suppressed if it was 
obtained by means of police illegality. 
"In determining the validity of a 
confession or incriminating statements 
following police illegality, two inquiries 
must be made. First, the court must 
determine ... whether the confession was 
voluntary; [and] second, the court must 
determine ... whether the confession was 
obtained in the course of police 
exploitation of the prior illegality." State 
v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992). 
In considering the degree to which a 
confession is derived from police 
exploitation of a prior illegality, the court 
should consider "[ (1) ] whether Miranda 
warnings were given, [ (2) ] the temporal 
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proximity of the illegality and the 
confession, [ (3) ] the absence or 
presence of intervening circumstances, 
and [ (4) ] the purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct." Id. at 301. 
Here, Bertoch made the statements 
during the course of the frisk and in 
response to what the officer found during 
the frisk. Regardless of whether 
Bertoch's statements were voluntary, 
they were made as a direct result of the 
illegal frisk and must be suppressed. 
In sum, we conclude that the trooper's 
frisk was illegal and, as such, the pipe, 
marijuana, and Bertoch's pre-Miranda 
statements regarding them must be 
suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the 
trial court's denial of Bertoch's motion to 
suppress with regard to the pipe, 
marijuana, and related statements and 
remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision and 
Bertoch's conditional guilty plea. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS. 
Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Judge. 
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